In Nigeria, the 52 years of independence have been spent in wars and war related tensions. There have been 3 years of all-out war and 49 years of increased tension of quelling rebellions, insurgency and terrorism which have threatened, are threatening and will continue to threaten the nation’s unity. But these are internal wars and conflicts. Despite adorable Nigeria’s military finesse, Nigeria has never engaged in war of territorial contest with her next door neighbors. There have been skirmishes and diplomatic rows but none has ever led to an open war. Surprisingly, most of the Nigeria’s territorial disputes have been with Cameroon, over a peninsula which like a biblical Esau was sold to Jacob for a plate of porridge.
Nigeria’s claim to Bakassi is a tripartite attempt to keep, add and recover. Nigeria wants to keep a colonial heritage; to add to her sovereignty because Bakassi by International Court of Justice ruling belongs to Cameroon; and recover what was sold to Cameroon to undermine Biafra interest.
Bakassi, a peninsula which lies roughly between latitudes 40 25’ and 5010’N and longitude 8020’ and 9008’E has a disputed population of between 150, 000 and 300, 000 people. Situated at the extreme eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea, Bakassi is a fertile fishing ground comparable to Newfoundland in North America owing to interaction between two ocean currents- Guinea and Benguela. With no commercially viable oil deposits found yet, the area is believed to have a high grade crude oil reserve.
The history of who owns Bakassi is as old as the Europe’s scramble for Africa in the 1884-5 Berlin Conference. It is on record that on September 10, 1884, Queen Victoria signed a treaty of protection with kings and chiefs of Old Calabar thereby giving the whole of Calabar including Bakassi under UK control. By this treaty the whole territory became part of what would later be called Nigeria though there was never a permanent delineation of border. However, Cameroonian documents clearly place the peninsula under Cameroon territory as a result of Anglo-German agreement of the colonial era.
But the problem is that after the Southern Cameroon voted in 1961 to leave Nigeria and become part of Cameroon, Bakassi remained under Calabar administration in Nigeria. Both Nigeria and Cameroon have always contested the ownership of the peninsula, sometimes to the brink of war. In 1981 for instance, both countries nearly collided as another area around Lake Chad also became contentious. More armed clashes broke out in the early 1990s.
In response to the incessant clashes, Cameroon took the matter to International Court of Justice on March 29, 1994. Nigeria’s arguments at the court centered on Anglo-German correspondence dating to 1885 plus treaties between colonial powers and indigenous powers. Cameroon pointed to Anglo-German treaty of 1913 which defined the spheres of control of the area but most heavily to the two agreements signed in the 1970s between Nigeria and Cameroon- Yaounde II Declaration of April 4, 1971 and the Maroua declaration of June 1, 1975. These two agreements, though never ratified by Nigeria, were targeted at the crushed Biafra rebels by Gowon-led Nigeria government.
On October 10, 2002, the ICJ delivered its verdict ruling that the ownership rests with Cameroon and instructed Nigeria to transfer the possession of the peninsula but did not require the inhabitants to move or change their nationality. The former Nigerian Attorney General and Minister of Justice who had been a leading member of Nigeria’s team described the decision as “50% international law and 50% international politics”, “blatantly biased and unfair”, “ a total disaster and “ a complete fraud.” The Guardian went further declaring that it was “a rape and unforeseen potential international conspiracy against Nigeria territorial integrity and sovereignty” and part of a Western ploy “to foment and perpetuate trouble in Africa.”
Generally unwelcomed, Nigerian government did not however openly reject the judgment but instead called for an agreement that would provide peace and guarantee the interest and welfare of the people. More so, the ruling had United Nations’ backing whose charter potentially allowed sanctions or even the use of force to enforce the court’s ruling. Consequently, the former Secretary General, Kofi Annan stepped in as a mediator and chaired a tripartite summit with two countries’ presidents on November 15, 2002, which established a commission to facilitate the implementation of the ruling. A further summit was held on January 31, 2004. Though there was a significant progress but the agitation of Bakassi‘s inhabitants not to be transferred to Cameroon became a major obstacle. Bakassi leaders threatened to seek independence if Nigeria renounced sovereignty and later on a group of militants including Southern Cameroon under the aegis of Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO), Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination (BAMOSD), and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), went ahead to announce their secession on July 9, 2006 declaring the peninsula “Democratic Republic of Bakassi.”
On June 13, 2006, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo and Cameroon’s Paul Biya resolved the contentious issue in New York in talks led by Kofi Annan. In the agreement, ‘The Green Tree Agreement,’ Obasanjo agreed to withdraw Nigeria troops within 60 days and to leave the territory completely in Cameroonian control within the next two years. As a result, beginning from August 1, 2006, Nigeria began withdrawing its forces comprising some 3, 000 troops and the 13 days that followed, August 14, marked the formal handover of the peninsula. The remainder stayed under Nigerian civil authority for two more years. On November 22, 2007, the Nigeria Senate passed a resolution declaring that the withdrawal from the Bakassi was illegal but the government handed over the final part on August 14, 2008 as planned, ignoring the Senate and the Federal High Court’s injunction which had asked that handover be delayed.
As the deadline for appeal would expire by October 9, 2012, Nigeria faces a grim prospect of permanently losing Bakassi unless decisive steps are taken to intervene. Worried by this, the Senate in unanimous resolution on September 26, 2012, urged FG to appeal the judgment. This move has generated mixed reactions. Richard Akinjide of, all people, sees it as a disaster. An Abuja-based group, Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA) has urged the National Assembly not to dissipate energy on the call to review the judgment.
Still others like Elechi Amadi insist that the review is necessary. Truly, article 16 of the statute of ICJ requires appeal which includes among others, areas of error or unknown facts from the judgment. The Senate observes that there has never been precedent history where any case of this nature was executed without a referendum as enshrined by the United Nations. The argument is that there are emerging facts that were previously unknown before the ruling and more so in the first trial there was absence of Nigerian legal representation.
Though, Article 3(1) and 2(a) of the ‘Green Tree Agreement’ stipulate that after the transfer of the territory to Cameroon, Cameroonian authorities should guarantee the Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula the exercise of their fundamental human rights and other relevant provisions of the international law. But there are concerns that the agreement is against UN charter which would have allowed the Bakassi people choose where they want to belong. It is worth noting that every agreement Nigerian government has ever signed with regards to Bakassi has always been wrapped in illegalities.
Though these illegalities permanently leave the contest open, my opinion is that the call to review the judgment is curiously untimely. Secondly, most of the people calling for the review were part of the government conspiracy to sell off the peninsula but now choose to be blind to that political game. Perhaps, if Niger Delta experience has taught anything, it is that Nigeria is not interested in the people but what their land can give; after all what has Nigeria done for Bakassi people before and after the ruling. If Nigeria claims to care for Bakassi people, they should militarily support their quest for self-determination under a formal treaty between them and a nation that will eventually come from the struggle. Should Nigeria finally secure the peninsula to be part of it, it will one day boil like Niger delta over marginalization. So far, the way we have treated the people of the peninsula does not give hope that we will protect them after the proposed political or military option turns to Nigeria’s favour.
Besides, Nigeria at the moment has many internal security challenges. An average Nigerian on the street is aggressive because of a general sapping of confidence in the Nigerian project. Each day brings new evidence that the ways our leaders habitually misbehave sabotage destiny, strengthen poverty and threaten our future. There is a need to be cautious with Bakassi issue because those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. If Nigeria insists in reclaiming Bakassi, I will not dispute it neither will join the struggle. But I am afraid the call for review is a delay strategy.
